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ROTH-ALBERTS HELD INAPPOSITE TO FILMED OBSCENITY
Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88,
198 N.E.2d 242, 248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964)
In March, 1962, the Bureau of Customs approved the importation
of the Danish motion picture "A Stranger Knocks" (hereafter referred
to as "the Film") by Trans-Ltu Distributing Corporation, owner of the
distribution rights in the United States, after objectionable scenes had
been deleted at the direction of a customs official.' One year later, on the
Distributing Corporation's application for a license to exhibit the Film
in New York, the Director of the Motion Picture Division of the State
Education Department denied a license until the Distributing Corporation
cut two scenes depicting sexual intercourse 2 which the Director had found
"obscene pursuant to Section 122 3 of the State Education Law." 4 The
State Board of Regents sustained the determination of the Director. In
a proceeding on appeal before the Appellate Division of the State Supreme
Court,5 the court, in a memorandum, annulled the Board's determination,
1 Record, pp. 65-69, Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 19 App. Div.
2d 937, 244 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1963).
2 The scenes were described as follows:
Reel 3D: In scene on beach between man and Vibecka after she has dis-
carded her bathing suit, eliminate view of man's hand moving robe aside and
carressing her bare knee and thigh, views of man moving into position on
her body, and closeup view of her face indicating her erotic response to
completion of coital act. Reel 4D: In scene in which Vibecka and man engage
in sexual intercourse on couch, eliminate all views from point where she is
seen straddling his body to point at which she notices scar on his arm.
Id. at 38-39.
3 Ibid. N.Y. Educ. Law § 122 (McKinney Supp. 1964) provides:
Licenses: the director of the division or, when authorized by the regents, the
officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every
motion picture film submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film
or part thereof is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of
such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite
to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so author-
ized, such officer shall not license any film submitted he shall furnish to the
applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a descrip-
tion of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto.
N.Y. Educ. Law § 122-a (McKinney Supp. 1964) provides, in pertinent part:
Definitions. 1. For the purpose of section one hundred twenty-two of this
chapter, the term 'immoral' and the phrase 'of such character that its exhibi-
tion would tend to corrupt morals' shall denote a motion picture film or
part thereof, the dominant purpose or effect of which is erotic or porno-
graphic; or which portrays acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewd-
ness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such acts as desirable, accept-
able or proper patterns of behavior.
4 Record, supra note 1, at 39.
5 The case was referred from State Supreme Court for disposition.
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found the Film not obscene, 6 and ordered the Board to issue a license. The
Appellate Division held the Roth-Alberts test7 controlling with respect to
the Film's allegedly obscene scenes, and believed without elaboration that
the Supreme Court's summary reversal in Times-Film v. City of Chicago8
was, by analogy, dispositive of the issue. The dissent, implicitly adopting
the language of the Model Penal Code,9 believed that "the portrayals
therein go substantially beyond the accepted customary limits" and, con-
sequently, refused to apply Roth-Alberts, stating that: ". . . these deline-
ations are sui generis, rendering the usual test of obscenity impossible to
apply with any reasonableness." 10
On appeal to the court of appeals, the case was reversed and remanded
to reinstate the Board's determination. 1 The two objectionable scenes
portraying sexual intercourse were deemed obscene within the State
Education Law because they portrayed obscene behavior on the screen but
6 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 19 App. Div. 2d 937, 244
N.Y.S.2d 333 (1963). The court said: "The decisions of the Supreme Court in
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago (355 U.S. 35) and Roth v. United States
(354 U.S. 476) compel us to annul the determination of the Board of Regents. The
sexual acts, which are implied rather than demonstrated, are an integral part of the
play."
7 Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (Res:
mailing, keeping for sale, and advertising obscene matter). The Supreme Court
held that "obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest." (id. at 487) which the Court defined as "material having a tendency
to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 487 n. 20. The test then became: "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
8 355 U.S. 35 (1958), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957) (Film: "Game of
Love"; theme: sexuality). Scenes from the film variously depicted a boy in the
nude, his seduction by an older woman, and sexual relations with other girls. The
court below described the film at 436: "The narrative is graphically pictured with
nothing omitted except those sexual consummations which are plainly suggested
but meaningfully omitted and thus, by the very fact of omission, emphasized ...
the calculated purpose of the producer of this film, and its dominant effect, are sub-
stantially to arouse sexual desires."
9 Model Penal Code § 251.4(1), (Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962).
"Material is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest, in nudity, sex or excretion, and if in
addition it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in describing or
representing such matters." (Emphasis supplied.) Judicial use of the word "ob-
scenity," as above, has improperly restricted its meaning. Etymologically, obscenity
denotes ugliness; that which is offensive or disgusting. See Partridge, Origins: A
Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (1959) and D. H. Lawrence
Pornography and Obscenity (1930).
10 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 6, at 937; 244
N.Y.S.2d at 333.
11 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 14 N.Y.2d 88, 198 N.E.2d 242.
248 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1964) (4 to 3 decision), appeal docketed, 33 U.S.L. Week 3045,
(U.S. July 22, 1964) (No. 314).
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not because of any advocacy of "obscene" ideas (commonly referred to as
thematic obscenity)."s
The Film's theme is a contrived adaptation of Cain's legend.13 A
widow, mourning her husband's death while he was serving in the Danish
Resistance, lives in seclusion. A chance encounter with a stranger who,
unknown to her, is a Nazi collaborator now on the run, leads to an illicit
relationship, where her surrender and satisfaction are obviously physical.
In a disputed scene' 4 at the height of their passion, she notices a scar-
symbolizing the mark set upon Cain-which reveals her partner as her
husband's executioner. Vengeance is hers as she wrings a confession
from her lover and finally kills him.
Whatever redeeming social importance the Film may have indisputably
stems from its updating of the ancient cycle-murder engendering venge-
ance which precipitates still another murder-and its depiction of the con-
tinuance of the cycle because of man's stubborn refusal to accept a rule
of law or, ultimately, the will of the Almighty. Arguably, the recog-
nition scene is a thematic sine qua non, not only because it emphasizes
the cyclical progression of the theme, but also because it communi-
cates the impression that love and hate co-exist, disguised as diametri-
cally opposed attitudes, in one individual, however latent one attitude
may appear at any given point in time. Although in condemning the
two sequences the court laid particular emphasis on the woman's "facial
expressions indicative of orgasmic reaction" and "their bodily move-
ments," 15 it at least recognized the thematic structure of the Film, quot-
ing from the Distributing Corporation's affidavit which described the
Film's climax as "a groan of pleasure and pain, a dramatic and eloquent
expression of the persistent ambivalence in the relationship." 16
The core of the court of appeals' reasoning (implicitly adopted from
the dissenting opinion below), finds the Film raising the issue of obscenity
in isolated filmed behavior, rather than obscenity in the advocacy of a
theme. New York decisions condoning prohibition of the latter have
consistently been reversed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court.
For example, in Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson,1 7 the Supreme Court,
reversing New York's proscription on thematic sacrilege in the film, "The
Miracle," held such statutory censorship void for its vagueness and all-
12 The issues of prior restraint, imposed by the New York statute, and federal
preEmption, created by the prior determination made by the Bureau of Customs,
were not discussed by the court, though they were properly raised and preserved.
They will not be included within the limited scope of this note.
13 The following quote from Genesis 4:15 was superimposed on the screen:
"And the Lord set his mark upon Cain lest any finding him should kill him.
Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, vengeance shall be taken from him sevenfold."
14 See supra note 2 for a description.
15 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 11, at 90, 198
N.E2d at 243, 248 N.Y.S2d at 858.
10 Ibid.
17 343 U.S. 495 (1952), reversing 303 N.Y. 242, 101 N.E.2d 665 (Film: "The
Miracle"; theme: sacrilege).
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inclusiveness. But the Supreme Court noted that it had not considered
the question of cinematic censorship "under a clearly drawn statute
designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films."' 8 Thus the
Burstyn Court, while supporting the protection of thematic advocacy in
film,19 recognized that the difference in the manner of filmed communica-
tion may necessitate regulation:
Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject
to the precise rules governing any other particular method of
expression. Each method tends to present its own peculiar
problems.20
This distinction was extracted in Trans-Lux and used to justify avoidance
of the Roth-Albert test.
Subsequently, in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents 21
the Supreme Court, relying solely on Burstyn, summarily reversed the
New York Court of Appeals, which had denied a license to a film depicting
fornication and adultery. The film, "La Ronde," had been deemed im-
moral by the Board because its exhibition "would tend to corrupt morals"
within the meaning of section 122 of the Education Law. 22 The important
underlying philosophy in Burstyn and Commercial Pictures-a philosophy
initiated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States 23 and adopted
by Trans-Lux-is that the matter to be expressed is constitutionally pro-
tected, but the manner of that expression is susceptible to regulation.
Significant with respect to the matter-manner distinction is the
handling in Trans-Lux of New York's most recent case on cinematographic
obscenity, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents.2 4 The Trans-Lux
court refers only to Mr. Justice Stewart's differentiation between the cine-
matic expression of an idea (therein advocacy of adultery) and the manner
of its portrayal. Mr. Justice Stewart had said, in pertinent part:
18 Id. at 506.
19 Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 17, at 501: "It cannot be doubted
that motion pictures are a significant media for the communication of ideas ...
The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by
the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.' See also Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
20 Joseph Burstyn Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 17, at 503.
21 346 U.S. 587 (1954), reversing 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953).
22 The court of appeals may have oversimplified the issue: "It should be re-
membered that we are not here dealing with a moral concept about which our people
widely differ; sexual immorality is condemned throughout our land.' Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, at 347, 113 N.E.2d 502, at 507.
23 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The Justice's classic remark was, "The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theatre and causing a panic."
24 360 U.S. 684 (1959), reversing 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.2d
39 (1958) (Film: "Lady Chatterley's Lover," a French import; theme: adultery).
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[T]he New York Court of Appeals tells us that the relevant
portion of the New York Education Law requires the denial of a
license to any motion picture which approvingly portrays an
adulterous relationship, quite without reference to the manner
of its portrayal.2 5
The Trans-Lux court adopts Justice Stewart's distinction in order to dis-
tinguish Kingsley and to place the Film in issue in the category wherein
the manner of expression may be constitutionally regulated.
The confusion surrounding the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley
eventuates from the fact that the High Court purposely avoided a con-
frontation on the issue of obscenity per se; rather, it preferred to dispose
of the case on the ground, previously charted in Burstyn,26 that the ex-
hibition of a motion picture may not be prohibited because of an idea
which that picture advocates.27 The issue of obscenity, however, was raised
and preserved by both Kingsley 28 and the Board.29 And contrary to the
view of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Conway, speaking for the ma-
jority, unmistakably believed and held that the film was obscene: "We
reiterate that this case involves the espousal of sexually immoral acts
(adultery) plus actual scenes of suggestive and obscene nature." 30 Yet
25 Id. at 688.
20 See notes 17-20 supra, and accompanying text
27 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684 at 688.
28 Brief for Respondent, Point II, p. 11, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684 (1959) reversing 4 N.Y.2d 349, 151 N.E.2d 197, 175 N.Y.S2d 39 (1958).
20 Brief for Appellant, Point I, pp. 6-7, 9, Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents, supra note 28.
30 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 4 N.Y.2d at 356, 151 N.E.2d at
200, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 44 (parenthetical insert supplied.) See also 4 N.Y. 2d 349 at
354, 358; 151 N.E.2d 197 at 199, 201; 175 N.Y.S.2d 39 at 42, 46. Note the similarity
between the statement of the objectionable scenes in Kingsley, which follow, and
the Trans-Lux scenes, supra note 2:
Reel 2D: Eliminate all views of Mellors and Lady Chatterley in cabin from
point where they are seen lying on cot together, in a state of undress, to end of
sequence.
Reel 3D: Eliminate all views of Mellors caressing Lady Chatterley's buttock
and all views of him unzipping her dress and caressing her bare back. Eliminate
following spoken dialogue accompanying these actions:
"Mais tu es nu... "But you're nude...
Tu es nue sous ta robe, You're nude under your dress,
et tu ne le disais pas... and you didn't say so...
Que'est-ce que tu as?" What is it?"
Eliminate accompanying English superimposed titles:
"You have nothing on..."
"And you didn't say so..
"What is it?"
Reel 4D: Eliminate entire sequence in Mellors' bedroom, showing Lady Chat-
terley and Mellors in bed, in a state of undress. Reason: "Immoral" within the
intent of our law. Record, Exhibit A, p. 21; see also Brief for Appellant, supra
note 29, at 4-5.
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the Supreme Court, in the teeth of Chief Justice Conway's opinion, said:
"The Court of Appeals unanimously and explicitly rejected any notion that
the film is obscene." 31
It would seem that the New York court in Kingsley recognized that
the dominant theme of the film, taken as a whole, was not obscene under
the Roth-Alberts test,32 notwithstanding the two objectionable scenes, and
therefore predicated its holding not only on the "scenes of obscenity"
33
but also on the film's presentation of adultery as a proper pattern of
behavior. Thus this new ground which the Supreme Court sedulously
avoided in Kingsley has become the key issue which Trans-Lux now
raises again.
Because the Trans-Lux court could not dismiss judicial acceptance of
thematic obscenity, it carefully sought to predicate its holding specifically on
the question of the obscenity vel non of isolated filmed behavior. The result
was reached via an analogy between New York's acknowledged power to
control sexual behavior displayed in public and its power to control similar
behavior represented on the screen. The court confined the censor to
cinematographic conduct which, had it occurred in public, would have
been contra bonos mores.34 Curiously, the court failed to discuss its prior
holding in Matter of Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents,3 5
wherein a fictionalized depiction of the activities of members of a nudist
group in a secluded private camp was found not obscene. Yet Mr.
Justice Desmond's analogy for the majority in Excelsior squares with
the analogy relied on in Trans-Lux. The theory that "the showing of
crimes in . . . cinema is evil only when it is done in a dirty way or
when it glorifies the criminal act," 36 has as its progeny Mr. Justice
Burke's present theory that a filmed simulation of real conduct, which
conduct is illegal solely because it is shocking, offensive to see and generally
destructive of morality, shares the evil of the original.37
In sum, the court struck a line between permissible advocacy and
proscribed action. Speech (the communication of an idea) was not re-
garded as the issue; rather, a particular display of conduct (the vehicle for
the communication of that idea), which "bears no necessary relationship to
31 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 686.
32 Supra note 7.
33 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 4 N.Y2d 349 at 354, 175
N.E.2d at 199, 175 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
34 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 11, at 93, 198
N.E.2d at 245, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
35 3 N.Y.2d 237, 144 N.E.2d 31, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957), affrning 2 App. Div.
2d 941, 156 N.Y.S.2d 800 (1957) (Film: "Garden of Eden"; theme: nudity).
36 For a discerning definition of obscenity as that which is dirty, revolting to
the senses and, therefore, unappealing, see D. H. Lawrence, op. cit. supra note 9, at
12-13 and discussion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Kingsley Int'l Pictures
Corp. v. Board of Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 692-93.
37 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 11, at 93, 198 N.E2d
at 245, 248 N.Y.S2d at 861.
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the freedom to speak, write, print, or distribute information or opinion" 38
was forbidden. That distinction adhered to the Supreme Court's generally
protective attitude toward thematic expression in film and, at the same
time, gave the Board a guideline within which it could proscribe filmed
sexual behavior under New York's statute.
Pending final disposition of Trans-Lux by the Supreme Court, New
York's judicial superintendence over the obscene has dearly set apart
filmed behavior from pictorial 39 or printed 40 communication. As early as
1922, Mr. Justice Andrews, speaking for the court of appeals on the ob-
scene in literature, declared:
No work may be judged from a selection of such paragraphs
alone. Printed by themselves they might, as a matter of law, come
within the prohibition of the statute. . . . The book, however,
must be considered broadly as a whole.41
This rule for printed work both foreshadowed the Roth-Alberts test and
underlined the prevailing trend in New York.42 Recently, Mr. Justice
Desmond bitterly scored what should be the last word on written obscenity:
38 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 11, at 95, 198 N.E2d
at 247, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 863, the court quoting from Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
161 (1939). Trans-Lux relied on People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272,
240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question,
375 U.S. 42 (1963), wherein an ordinance prohibiting maintenance of a clothesline
in a yard abutting a street did not constitute an unconstitutional abridgement of free
speech of property owners who erected clotheslines, cluttered with bizarre parapher-
nalia, as a "peaceful protest" against their tax assessment. The Stover court said at
page 470, 191 N.E2d at 277, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 740: "The ordinance and its prohibition
bear 'no necessary relationship' to the dissemination of ideas or opinion.... It is ob-
vious that the value of their 'protest' lay not in its message but in its offensiveness."
39 E.g., People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681,
216 N.Y.S2d 369 (1961) (Magazine: "Gent"); Larkin v. G.I. Distribs., Inc.,
14 N.Y.2d 869 (1964) (Magazine: described as similar to "Gent").
40 E.g., Larkin v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399 (1964) (Book: "Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure," known as "Fanny Hill"; theme: sexuality).
41 Halsey v. New York Soc'y for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 4, 136
N.E. 219, 220 (1922) (Book: "Mademoiselle de Maupin").
42 In what is now a maverick case, the conviction of a book publisher was up-
held in People v. Fritch, 13 N.Y.2d 119, 192 N.E2d 713, 243 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1963)
(Book: "Tropic of Cancer"). But Fritch was rendered inefficacious by the Supreme
Court's per curiam opinion on the same work in Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 84
Sup. Ct. 1909 (1964), reversing 156 So. 2d 537 (Fla. App. 1963). Subsequently, the
New York Court of Appeals held "Fanny Hill"-"an erotic book, concerned prin-
cipally with sexual experiences largely normal, but some abnormal"-not obscene, and
in so doing, expressly recognized the Supreme Court trend in Grove Press and
Tralins v. Gerstein, 84 Sup. Ct. 1903 (1964), reversing 151 So. 2d 19 (Fla. App. 1963)
(Book: "Pleasure Was My Business"; theme: brothel life). Larkin v. G.P. Putnam's
Sons, supra note 40.
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
In New York State from now on there are not and cannot be
any barriers to the general sale to purchasers of any age of
the most blatant and unmistakable pornography provided there be
discoverable therein some social or stylistic significance. 43
Prior to Trans-Lux, the probable performance of the New York court
should have been predictable not only by its approval of a nudist film 44
and a film demonstrating, at once candidly and scientifically, human birth,4 5
but also by the Supreme Court's directive that an immoral theme is worthy
of first amendment protection.4 6 But with the decision in Trans-Lux, the
Board can proscribe explicitly filmed sexual intimacies per se without
applying the Roth-Alberts test :47 whether, by applying the contemporary
national48 standard, the dominant theme of the film taken as a whole,
including the obscene sequences, would appeal to the prurient interest of an
average person.
Rather, New York's procedure for uncovering and deleting obscene
sequences, as derived from Trans-Lux, would necessitate four steps: (1)
the questioned scene is isolated from the film; (2) the scene is appraised
to determine that it displays on the screen conduct forbidden in public solely
because such conduct is (a) obscene and (b) proscribed by statute; (3)
following, a fortiori, it is determined that the scene is obscene under the
state regulatory law, and (4) the scene is ordered eliminated from the
film before the acceptable remainder is licensed for exhibition.
From the posture of workability, this method has a noteworthy draw-
back. The test fails to take into account the possibility that the scene,
notwithstanding its obscene nature when judged per se, may be a significant
element in the artistic communication of a socially important theme. In
recognizing that obscenity may flourish in non-thematic interludes of
43 Supra note 40, at 406.
44 Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 35.
45 Capital Enterprises v. Regents, 1 App. Div. 2d 990, 149 N.Y.S2d 920 (1956)
(Film: "Mom & Dad"; theme: child birth).
46 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 21, and Kingsley
Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 24.
47 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 11, at 96, 198 N.E2d
at 247, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 863. The court's deviation from the strict Roth-Alberts test
may have been predictable from prior court dicta: "If any single item, considered as
a whole, were pornographic, the circumstance that it was included in a collection
otherwise without taint would not save it from criminal prosecution." People v.
Richmond County News, Inc., supra note 39, at 587, 175 N.E.2d at 686, 216 N.Y.S2d
at 376. (Emphasis supplied.)
48 The Supreme Court abruptly switched to a national standard in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 84 Sup. Ct. 1676 (1964) (Film: "The Lovers"; theme: adultery): "We
thus reaffirm the position taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional
status of an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national
standard. It is, after all, a national constitution we are expounding." Id. at 1682.
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting, replied: "It is my belief that when the Court
said in Roth that obscenity is to be defined by reference to 'community standards' it
meant community standards-not a national standard as is sometimes argued." Id.
at 1685. See note 52 infra, and accompanying text.
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films, the court discovered a distasteful reality-possible irresponsible
commercial exploitation of obscenity-which should be curbed.4 9 But the
remedy becomes less desirable than the malady when the test precludes
isolated obscenity regardless of its materiality to the theme. Roth-Alberts
recognized that the entire work demands appraisal as a prerequisite to a
determination of its obscene quality. And Manual Enterprises v. Day 50
took further steps to protect expression by requiring a showing-before
Roth-Alberts became applicable-of materials
deemed so offensive on their face as to affront current community
standards of decency-a quality that we shall hereafter refer to
as 'patent offensiveness' or 'indecency.' Lacking that quality,
the magazines cannot be deemed legally 'obscene,' and we need
not consider the question of the proper 'audience' by which their
'prurient interest' appeal should be judged.5 1
Foreshadowing the disposition of Trans-Lux on appeal, the Supreme
Court, in Jacobellis v. Ohio,52 reaffirmed its position that the standard in
Roth-Alberts is applicable to the film media and held that an explicit love
scene was not obscene by that standard. The scene in issue, which inter
alia visually suggested cunnilingus, was inadequately described by the
Ohio Court as ". . . three minutes of complete revulsion during the
showing of an act of perverted obscenity." 53 Some of the testimony
indicated that the depiction of the unreserved love affair was necessary not
only to show that the heroine was not flitting simply from one affair to
another, but also to make her transformation and conduct appear credible. 4
The Supreme Court, employing broad brushstrokes, gave no description
of the film's theme or the questioned scene. 55 This omission will not
facilitate the application of Roth-Alberts to prospective obscenity cases!
49 Trans-Lux Distrib. Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 11, at 96, 198 N.E.2d
at 247, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
50 370 U.S. 478 (1962), reversing 289 F2d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (Magazines:
"MANual," "Trim," and "Grecian Guild Pictorial").
51 Id. at 482.
92 Supra note 48. The decision in acobellis was handed down midway between
New York's decision in Trans-Lux and the submission of the jurisdictional statement
on appeal. A resolution of the conflict of judicial attitudes marked by Jacobellis and
Trans-Lux is particularly important in light of several obscenity cases which cur-
rently appear on New York's appellate docket. E.g., People v. Lida, 42 Misc. 2d 56,
247 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Crim. Ct. 1964), People v. Hay, 41 Misc. 2d 606, 245 N.Y.S.2d
705 (Crim. Ct. 1963).
53 173 Ohio St. 22, 28, 179 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1962).
54 Record, p. 462, Brief for Appellant, p. 8, Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 48.
5 The film portrayed a genteel woman's boredom with life among her coterie
and with her dutiful but preoccupied husband. Her meeting a poetic young student
was accidental, their physical attraction explosive, as he becomes the vehicle by
which she can renounce her secure world. With her paramour, she abandons her
home and her child, expecting a grim, uncertain future, yet regretting nothing.
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Judges, attorneys, and students of the subjects cannot predict with sufficient
certainty what filmed behavior the Court would proscribe because the
Court has not adequately described the filmed behavior it has condoned5 6
It would also appear that the Supreme Court has not given film
reviewing boards a workable standard, because it has not recognized the
apparent fact that a film, although thematically acceptable when judged in
its entirety, may contain isolated but patently offensive sequences of no
social value by the national standard. In addition, these scenes may not
serve the idea the film advocates. The Trans-Lux court appreciated that
problem when it held the Roth-Alberts standard not applicable if the
censor was willing to license the Film conditioned upon the deletion of the
objectionable scenes. But the question should then become whether the
censor's scissor should delete a scene which the craftsman feels is essential
to an aesthetic appreciation of the entire film. A reasonable answer in-
corporating Roth-Alberts would necessitate a weighing of the scene's
prurient appeal against that scene's relationship to the redeeming social
importance of the entire film. Particular emphasis should be placed on
whether the scene's deletion would attenuate the film's social message. This
intermediary weighing process would determine the fate of that scene
per se. The traditional Roth-Alberts test should still be applied to the
film taken as a whole. Again, emphasis should bear on whether the disputed
scene so infected the film that it must be cut if the film is to retain the
protection of the first amendment.
Furthermore, an obvious omission in Supreme Court opinions to
date is a full consideration of the effect of modal differences in communi-
cation among the media and dissimilar marketing methods within the
medium. It is strikingly apparent that cinematic expression of obscenity
has the inherent capacity for the greatest evil :5 (1) films are capable of
depicting the obscene in its most graphic form, (2) films prey on the
group audience whose attention is directed and concentrated on a screen
with minimal distraction, the combination of which factors increases the
individual's response to whatever prurient stimulus is present, (3) films
attract the unsophisticated youngster because, inter alia, films generally
require less mental concentration and comprehension for their enjoyment,
and (4) films are susceptible to irresponsible marketing techniques directed
at an immature audience with emphasis upon the film's seamy episodes.
56 Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, was not particularly instructive: ". . . I
know [hard core pornography] when I see it and the motion picture involved in
this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra note 48, at 1683.
57 However, Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Commercial Films Corp. v.
Regents, supra note 21, at 588, lumped films with other media of communication, sug-
gesting that censorship is per se inapplicable to all media:
Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than (sic) the
public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First
Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods of com-
municating ideas. On occasion one may be more powerful or effective than
another. The movie, like the public speech, radio, or television, is transitory-
here now and gone in an instant.
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The study of a combination of these and other factors has been fre-
quently referred to as the theory of variable obscenity. 58 Chief Justice
Warren, concurring in Roth-Alberts, recognized the importance of applying
such variables to each obscenity question, and suggested that different re-
sults may be realized under varying circumstances:
The line dividing the salacious or pornographic. . . is not straight
and unwavering. . . It is manifest that the same object may
have a different impact, varying according to the part of the
community reached. . . . The nature of the standards is, of
course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but
the materials are thus placed in context from which they draw
color and character. A wholly different result might be reached
in a different setting.5 9
His argument has been virtually ignored by all but scholarly writers,
though some legislation has been drawn restricting the exhibition of films
"for adults only." 60 Such classification legislation faces as its most serious
obstacle attacks on its vagueness 61 and unreasonableness. 2 Sufficient par-
ticularity in drafting is necessary to provide adequate guidance for
exhibitor and censor.
It is suggested that the significant non-procedural 3 distinction that
can be drawn between Jacobellis and Trans-Lux is that the latter expressly
denies applicability of Roth-Alberts to obscene conduct. On that basis,
Trans-Lux should be reversed summarily on the strength of Jacobellis,
unless the Supreme Court decides to depart from Roth-Alberts and permit
the deletion of specific patently offensive material. Taking the latter course,
the fate of Trans-Lux hinges on the Court's view of the composition and
character of the obscene in relief from the thematic structure of the Film
in its entirety.
64
58 See Lockhart & McClure, "Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standard," 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 68, 120 (1960).
59 Roth v. United States, supra note 7, at 495-96.
60 See Note, "'For Adults Only': The Constitutionality of Governmental Film
Censorship by Age Classification," 69 Yale L.J. 141 (1959).
01 E.g., Paramount Film Distribs. Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69
(N. D. Ill. 1959) (Film: "Desire Under The Elms"; classification: 21 years of age);
People v. The Bookcase, Inc., 14 N.Y2d-(1964), reversing 42 Misc. 2d 55, 247
N.Y.S2d 470 (App. Div. 1964), affirming without opinion 40 Misc. 2d 796, 244
N.Y.S2d 297 (Crim. Ct. 1963) (Book: "Fanny Hill"; classification: 18 years of
age).
62 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). In reversing the conviction of de-
fendant for selling a book ". . . tending to the corruption of the morals of youth,"
the Court said at page 383: "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult
population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."
63 Procedurally, Jacobellis was brought on appeal from a conviction on two
counts for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film in violation of Ohio Re-
vised Code Ann. § 2905.34 (Page 1955).
64 Readers seeking a more extensive review of current trends in the area of
obscenity should consult, in addition to Lockhart & McClure's definitive article,
supra note 58, Gerber, "A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity," 112 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 834 (1964).
1964]
